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The Fiscal Framework and the Scotland Bill: 
Right on the money 
 
Anton Muscatelli, University of Glasgow 
 
 
 
On the 25th February 2016, the UK and Scottish Governments agreed the Fiscal Framework associated 
with the Scotland Bill1. The Fiscal Framework set out a number of the aspects governing the devolution 
of additional taxation and welfare spending powers as a result of the Smith Commission Agreement2. 
This is a good deal for both Scotland and the UK. 
 
It should be noted that the Fiscal Framework is a complex agreement covering a number of aspects of 
the additional powers. Elsewhere I have set out various aspects of the Fiscal Framework in detail and I 
have provided some analysis on the most controversial aspect of the agreement, which deals with the 
GHWHUPLQDWLRQRI6FRWODQG¶VUHPDLQLQJEORFNJUDQWDQGKRZLWLVDGMXVWHGLQGH[HGRYHUWLPH3. 
 
The block grant adjustment (BGA) mechanism for the devolution of additional income tax powers was at 
the centre of much of the debate. An excellent analysis of the different types of indexation is offered in a 
number of sources4. 
 
The bargaining position between the two governments, as far as one could discern from public sources, 
was the following: the Scottish Government had argued that the basis for the BGA should be the per-
capita indexed deduction method (PCID)5. This method would give Scotland the incentive to grow its tax 
base relative to the rest of the U.K., but would protect Scotland against demographic risks in addition to 
those present through the Barnett formula. The argument is that anything other than PCID fails to meet 
the Smith Commission's first no-detriment principle, and would have undermined the Smith commitment 
to maintain the Barnett formula as the cornerstone of the agreement. 
 
The U.K. Government seemed to initially focus on a levels deduction (LD) approach, which in a sense is 
a 'Barnett formula for tax'. The UK government's position was that PCID does not meet one part of the 
Smith Commission's Agreement's second no-detriment principle, around 'tax-payer fairness'. This would 
imply, for instance, that an increase in UK government spend on devolved areas such as the English 
NHS, financed using devolved income taxation would unduly benefit Scotland through the Barnett 
                                                        
1 See 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/503481/fiscal_framework_agreement_
25_feb_16_2.pdf  
2 https://www.smith-commission.scot/smith-commission-report/  
3 See my evidence to the Devolution (Further Powers) Committee at Holyrood 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_ScotlandBillCommittee/Inquiries/devolution_committee_-_AM_-_Final.pdf and 
my recent Stevenson lecture at the University of Glasgow - 
http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/socialpolitical/research/politics/stevensontrust/newsandevents/headline_445809_en.htm
l   
4 David Bell, David Eiser and David Phillips offer a survey of the three main approaches to the BGA ± see 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/8060 and the update in 
http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/blog/adjusting-VFRWODQG¶V-block-grant-options-table.  
5 A rationale for PCID was originally published in the Fraser Economic Commentary (Vol. 39, No. 1, June 2015) by 
Jim Cuthbert ± see http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/53549/1/FEC_39_1_2015_CuthbertJ.pdf  
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formula as Scottish taxpayers would gain additional funding net of the BGA. This is because the Scottish 
population share as a proportion of the UK LVODUJHUWKDQ6FRWODQG¶VVKDUHRI8.LQFRPHWD[DWLRQ6. 
 
In my evidence to the Devolution Committee7  I set out these two BGA methods and the Indexed 
Deduction (ID) method, a third method similar to PCID but which does not adjust for population changes. 
 
I argued in a number of interventions during the debate and in my evidence to this Committee and to the 
House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee that PCID is the only method which satisfies the major 
aspects of the Smith Commission Agreement. The Smith Commission agreement placed Barnett at the 
centre of the fiscal framework. The LD (and ID) methods erode Barnett over time and violate the first no-
detriment principle. They expose Scotland to additional demographic risk when Scotland does not have 
the policy levers to offset these trends. The current differential demographic trends between Scotland 
and the rest of UK as projected by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) are starkly different. Based on 
ONS population projections, the costs to Scotland of adopting LD instead of PCID would have amounted 
to a cumulative £7bn loss in real terms over the first 10 years of the Scotland Bill being enacted. Even 
with ID the losses would be very marked8. Hence anything but PCID erodes Barnett and does not deliver 
Smith. 
 
In the end, in the Agreement the governments reached, the following compromise position. 
 
There was a decision to use Barnett as the formula for the indexation mechanism for welfare with a 
100% comparability factor, which seems appropriate given the nature of the welfare devolution 
envisaged in the bill. 
 
The BGA adjustment indexation mechanism for tax (see Paragraphs 17-19 of the Agreement) is a 
FRPSURPLVH $ µ&RPSDUDEOH 0RGHO¶ ZLOO EH XVHG µWR HIIHFW WKH %*$¶. In essence this is a modified 
version RI WKH OHYHOV GHGXFWLRQ /' PHWKRG ,W LV PRGLILHG E\ D IDFWRU ZKLFK UHIOHFWV 6FRWODQG¶V
differential share of the UK tax pool for each of the devolved taxes. This is described in detail by Bell, 
Eiser and Phillips9. Indeed Bell et al call this modified /'µWD[-FDSDFLW\DGMXVWHGOHYHOVGHGXFWLRQ¶7&$-
/' ,QHVVHQFHWKLV%*$PHFKDQLVPPRYHVVRPHZD\WRWDNHDFFRXQWRI WKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶V
concern that LD exposes Scotland to additional risk by reducing the adjustment in the block grant in 
those taxes (like income tax) where Scotland has a lower share of the UK tax pool than its population 
share. 
 
Unlike Level Deduction (LD) the TCA-LD mechanism addresses the problem of Scotland initially having 
a lower share of UK tax revenues, but it still does not pURWHFW6FRWODQGµVEORFNJUDQWIURPWKHDGGLWLRQDO
GHPRJUDSKLFULVNGXHWR6FRWODQG¶VSRSXODWLRQJURZWKEHLQJVORZHUWKDQWKDWLQWKHUHVWRIWKH8.7KH
GHWULPHQW UHODWLYH WR WKH µQR-GHYROXWLRQ FDVH¶ RI DGRSWLQJ 7&$-LD is shown in Table 1 in Bell et al. 
                                                        
6 The problem is neatly set out in an example in Bell, Eiser and Phillips 
http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/blog/adjusting-scotland¶V-block-grant-options-table.  
7 See Slide 4 in my presentation 
(http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_ScotlandBillCommittee/Inquiries/devolution_committee_-_AM_-_Final.pdf)  
8 Indeed ID has other undesirable features which are explored in detail in the literature. 
9 see http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/blog/adjusting-VFRWODQG¶V-block-grant-options-table. 
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Curiously, in offering this compromise with the hybrid TCA-LD method the UK government in effect 
DEDQGRQHGLWVGHPDQGVIRUWKHµWD[-SD\HUIDLUQHVV¶SDUWRIWKHVHFRQGQR-detriment principle. 
 
However, whilst this TCA-LD mechanism is notionally calculating the BGA, in para. 20 in the agreement 
it is clear that this BGA mechanism is de facto overridden. Paragraph 20 of the agreement states that 
the outcome until 2021-22 will be that the BGA will shadow the per-capita indexed deduction method 
(PCID), which as nRWHGDERYHLVWKH6FRWWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VSUHIHUUHGPHWKRGDQGWKHDSSURDFK,KDG
supported. 
 
In essence, the TCA-LD method will be a shadow formula which is not operational during the initial 
duration of this Fiscal Framework Agreement (i.e. until 2021-22), during which de facto PCID will 
determine the BGA. 
 
The key question is what happens after 2021-22. This is set out in para. 20-23 of the Agreement and 
which was clearly one of main sticking points in the negotiation. 
 
The Agreement makes it clear that there will be an independent review which will inform the two 
JRYHUQPHQWV¶YLHZV7KHJRYHUQPHQWVZLOOGHFLGHWKURXJKDQHZQHJRWLDWLRQSRVW-2021, what the future 
LQGH[DWLRQPHFKDQLVPVKRXOGEH ,QHIIHFW WKLV LVD µVXQVHWFODXVH¶ IRU WKH%*$LQGH[DWLRQPHchanism 
post 2021-22. The important point is that there is no presumption that a particular method will be used 
after that date. The agreement does not specify what might happen if a methodology is not agreed in 
time for 2021-22. 
 
I have suggested that this agreement by the two governments is good for Scotland and for the UK. The 
reasons for this are the following: 
 
1. For Scotland, it ensures that PCID is de facto used to determine the BGA, thus avoiding 
additional demographic risk. 
 
2. For Scotland, it is important that the first no-detriment principle as embedded in the PCID 
method is still operative and does not automatically lapse after 2021. 
 
3. For the UK, although PCID does not, during the period until 2021-GHDOZLWKWKHLVVXHRIµWD[-
payer fairnHVV¶WKHVHFRQGSDUWRIWKHVHFRQG6PLWKQR-detriment principle) it ensures that this principle 
is not forgotten, and will be part of the 2021 review. It is important to stress that TCA-LD would not have 
GHDOWZLWKWKHµWD[-SD\HUIDLUQHVV¶SULQFLSOHHLWKHr, whilst LD would have. As I set out in my evidence to 
the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee, and in a recent Stevenson Trust lecture at the 
8QLYHUVLW\ RI *ODVJRZ D PRGLILHG YHUVLRQ RI 3&,' PLJKW KDYH DGGUHVVHG WKH µWD[-payer fairness 
principle¶PRUHGLUHFWO\E\DGMXVWLQJWKHEORFNJUDQWIXUWKHUZKHQHYHUDGGLWLRQDOLQFRPH-tax changes are 
made by the UK government to reflect changes in devolved spending. 
 
4. For the UK, the use of PCID in the next few years will not impact greatly on the µWD[-payer 
IDLUQHVV¶LVVXHDVWKHSHULRGXQWLO-22 is likely to be a period of continued fiscal consolidation, which 
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means that the issue of the UK government raising additional income taxation to fund additional UK 
spend in devolved areas such as NHS and education is unlikely to be substantive issue. Indeed the 
)LQDQFH$FWLQFOXGHGWKH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶VµWD[ORFNFRPPLWPHQW¶ZKLFKQRWLRQDOO\SURKLELWVWKH8.
government increasing income tax rates during the current parliament. This further limits aQ\ µXQIDLU¶
benefit from UK taxes to Scotland. 
 
5. For both Scotland and the UK, the period until 2021-22 provides a period in which we will learn 
more about the actual economic and demographic risks that emerge from the framework without having 
to rely on modelling assumptions and forecasts. 
 
6. For both Scotland and the UK as I stressed before it is important that the Agreement provides a 
stable framework. It is important that the different spending and taxation policy proposals for the 2016 
Scottish Parliamentary election by the political parties can be evaluated, and that this debate happens 
against the background of a Fiscal Framework which will not trade off changes in taxation and welfare 
spending decisions that would be swamped by an unstable block grant due to demographic effects. This 
Agreement provides that stability by taking away the issue of demographic risk, violating the first no-
detriment principle. 
 
My conclusion is that this agreement comes to the right decision on the BGA method. It is a pragmatic 
solution by the two governments which produces the right result, whilst conceding that a final decision 
on the BGA will not be considered until 2021, and it will need to be arrived at, following an independent 
review, by mutual agreement. It goes without saying that this review will be important as it will be difficult 
for either government to deviate from the conclusions of a genuinely independent review. 
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